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The Research Project 
Models of Co-operation between Local Governments and Social Organizations in Germany and China– Migration: 
Challenges and Solutions (LoGoSO Germany China) is a comparative research project of the Freie Universität 
Berlin, the Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster and the Chinese Academy of Governance, funded by 
Stiftung Mercator. 
This comparative research project looks at the co-operation between state and social organizations (SOs) in China 
and Germany. It focusses on social service delivery in the area of integration of migrating populations with special 
attention to the fields of education, employment, vulnerable groups and social assistance (incl. legal aid) as a 
crosscutting issue to all of the fields. Within this subject area, the project wants to identify different models of 
state-SO co-operation and analyze which models are successful and why and where this co-operation is 
problematic. It aims to capture the different models of co-operation in Germany and China, to analyze and 
compare the underlying structures and to show potentialities for development.
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Under the influence of the New Public Management, the cooperation between nonprofit organizations 
(NPOs) and local governments became a crucial part of modern governance (Salamon 1995). For a long 
time, theories of the welfare state have based their explanations for the involvement of NPOs in 
governance processes on a kind of government failure, where local governments cannot sufficiently 
provide social services, inducing social actors to step in and fill the gaps (see Salamon 1987: 33-36). 
Salamon (1987) further developed this debate and introduced his theory of voluntary failure to explain 
the importance of cooperation between NPOs and the government. According to this theory, the 
government mobilizes and supports the nonprofit sector to participate in governance processes. 
Thereby NPOs support the social service provision of the government, while, at the same time, the 
government balances the shortcomings of NPOs such as limited resources and inadequate distribution 
of resources (Salamon 1987: 36-42).  Recently, this discussion gained momentum in both Germany and 
China in response to the challenges associated with social service provision for migrants. In Germany, 
approximately 890,000 asylum seekers1 entered the country in 2015 and overloaded the capacities of 
local administrations (see Altrock and Kunze 2016). Civil society actors responded by developing new 
programs and showing high potential for engagement and innovation. Chinese cities face similar 
challenges in regard to huge numbers of migrant workers moving from the poor rural areas in China 
to the affluent cities (see Cai and Liu 2015). In 2018, about 288 million migrant workers were counted 
in the whole country.2 Local governments must develop new means to provide social services and 
integration opportunities for these new populations in their cities. The administrations of Germany 
and China are in search of solutions to these new challenges, and in both countries, civil society has 
stepped in and played an increasingly important role in governance processes (see Hasmath and Hsu 
2018, Freise and Zimmer 2019).  
Based on the results of a three-year German-Chinese comparative research project 3 , this article 
investigates the underlying structures of state-society cooperation. Taking social services offered by 
societal actors to migrants in two Chinese and two German cities as case studies, we identify and 
analyse characteristics and underlying rationales of cooperation between local governments and NPOs. 
The results of our qualitative field research in the two countries show that German and Chinese local 
governments and NPOs display similar trends of cooperation structures, outsourcing, and Network 
Governance, albeit against different backgrounds and with differing power relations. We argue that 
NPOs and local governments deploy similar strategies in their cooperation that are aimed at tackling 
social problems, regardless of their political background. This research is based on first hand 
observations of social organizations in the provision of services for migrants in Germany and China. By 
categorizing cooperation models of NPOs and the state, this research contributes to the broader 
political science issue of governance. 
 
1  Press release of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 30 Sept. 2016, available at 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/DE/2016/09/asylsuchende-2015.html (last accessed 
August 16, 2019). 
2  National Bureau of Statistics of the Chinese government, 29 April 2019, available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201904/t20190429_1662268.html (last accessed August 16, 2019). 
3 Models of Cooperation between Local Governments and Social Organizations in Germany and China– Migration: 
Challenges and Solutions (LoGoSO Germany China) is a comparative research project of the Freie Universität 
Berlin, the Westfälische Wilhelms Universität Münster and the Chinese Academy of Governance, funded by 
Stiftung Mercator (project number: 1533200). The duration of the research project was September 2016 – August 
2019. 
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In recent years, the integration of migrants has become an exceptional challenge for local governments 
in China and Germany. The two countries look back at very different histories of migration. China has 
relatively little foreign immigration but experienced a short, intense phase of internal migration. 
Whereas Germany has a long history of immigration from foreign countries, which had many peaks 
during the last centuries (Ketels 2019: 7). This study focuses on the recent migration trends in both 
countries. In China, this refers to an intensified and more permanent internal migration in recent years. 
Huge numbers of people move from the poor rural regions to the affluent cities to improve their living 
conditions. The Chinese system does not recognize these migrants as full residents in their new 
destination but labels them as floating population, referring to persons who stay in one location only 
for a limited amount of time. The floating population is usually not eligible for the household 
registration (hukou) at their destination which is necessary in order to access social services. Migrant 
workers moving to the Chinese industrial centres in search of a better economic situation for their 
families are the largest group within the floating population (Levy 2017: 7-8).  
In Germany, the recent influx of large numbers of refugees from war-ridden countries like Syria, Iran 
and Afghanistan is at the centre of this study. Since 2015, the so-called “refugee crisis” has dominated 
the public debate, challenged the capacities of local administrations and aroused the engagement of 
NPOs. There are different legal forms of asylum in Germany, however, as they entail similar rights for 
the persons in question, all these groups will be referred to as “refugees” in this paper. Most refugees 
are expected to stay long term in Germany, therefore their access to social services and integration is 
a long-term political goal (Ketels 2019: 8, Levy 2017: 8-9). 
The challenges involved in the social service provision for the floating population in China, and for 
refugees in Germany, are similar in that the migrants do not have full access to regular social systems 
and local administrations lack resources and expertise to develop adequate solutions. In both countries, 
NPOs have responded to this challenge and showed exceptional engagement to develop support 
systems for migrants. Local administrations benefit from this work force and its expertise and readily 
establish cooperation models with NPOs. Migration therefore provides an excellent policy field to 
explore NPO-state cooperation models.  
The remaining part of this article is structured as follows: The literature review in section 2 provides 
an overview of previous research on state-NPO cooperation in western, i.e. North American and 
European, societies and in China. We then introduce our methods of data collection and analysis in 
section 3. In section 4, we develop the theoretical framework of outsourcing and networking for the 
analysis which is, in the subsequent section (5) deployed to the qualitative content analysis of nineteen 
cases of state-NPO cooperation. In the conclusion we summarize and discuss our results. 
2 State of the Art: Structures of State-NPO Cooperation in China and 
Germany 
State-NPO cooperation in China and Germany originates from very different backgrounds and contexts. 
In China, the authoritarian system, and the Communist Party’s exclusive claim to power, determine 
practically every development. Whereas, Germany traditionally depends on a corporatist power 
sharing system with the nonprofit sector as the backbone of the welfare state. However, both systems 
are confronted with similar in social service provision challenges and current discussions on best 
practices in service provision show parallels. Against the background of the New Public Management 
LoGoSO Research Papers No. 13/2019 | 3  
 
 
concept4, the governments in both countries develop cooperation forms with NPOs to make use of 
their productivity and expertise in social service provision.  
In Western research, several approaches have been taken to explain this cooperation. Zimmer 
emphasizes the markedly multifunctional nature of NPOs, which makes them open to different types 
of cooperation, including with the state (Zimmer 2010: 201). Najam (2000) identifies four different 
possibilities for state-NPO cooperation 'based on institutional interests and preferences for policy ends 
and means, i.e. cooperative, confrontational, complementary or co-optative. Young (2000) found that 
complementary, supplementary and adversarial relations between the state and nonprofit sectors 
exist in different countries but vary over time and relative dominance. For Salamon (1987), efficiency 
and effectiveness are the major drivers for government-third sector partnerships (Zimmer 2010: 201). 
Finally, Salamon and Toepler combine 'voluntary failure' and third-party government/new governance 
theory in their explanations for state and nonprofit cooperation. Voluntary failure denotes the 
deficiencies of the NPOs themselves that combine with the deficiencies of the market and the 
government and therefore enhance cooperation. In their view, typical deficiencies of NPOs are 
philanthropic insufficiency, philanthropic particularism, philanthropic paternalism, and philanthropic 
amateurism. New governance theory considers a broad range of government limitations with regard 
to solving social problems and complements the insights of New Public Management by emphasizing 
not only internal management mechanisms in state bureaucracies but also the different instruments 
of state/nonprofit cooperation. In particular, it seeks to utilize the special strengths of NPOs, such as 
their flexibility, their own institutional structures and their ability to tailor services to individual needs 
(Salamon and Toepler 2015: 2162 ff.). 
As for China, the predominate (Western) explanation for the close relationship between the state and 
NPOs is the theory of corporatism (Schmitter 1974), i.e. the top-down establishment, management 
and control of NPOs by the state (Unger and Chan 1995). More recently, Teets has added the concept 
of consultative authoritarianism to this China-related set of explanations for state/nonprofit 
cooperation. She shows how recentralization and tax reform in favour of the central government have 
forced local governments to consider NPOs as alternative public service providers. Increased 
dependence on NPOs has made the government reluctant to take violent and extra-legal actions 
against them (Teets 2014). Furthermore, recent approaches include Hildebrandt (2013), who explained 
the Chinese state-society relationship as a form of co-dependency. Levy and Pissler (forthcoming) take 
a functional perspective and suggest seeing the Chinese state/nonprofit cooperation as a form of 
governance. 
Recent economic and social developments in China required NPOs to develop new strategies and lead 
to a more complex involvement of them in governance processes (Ma and Liao 2015). Jing (2015) 
shows that, in reaction to these new economic and social developments and challenges, the Chinese 
government simultaneously intensified its control strategies and also began to actively empower the 
development of NPOs. In a similar vein, Kang and Han (2008) apply their “system of graduated controls” 
to analyse how far the extent of state control depends on the scope of the organization, its capacity to 
 
4  New Public Management (NPM) is an approach to make public services more market based rather than 
hierarchically organized. It first developed in the UK and Australia during the 1980s and soon gained popularity 
all over the world. Christopher Hood summarizes the main ideas of NPM as follows: “Hands- on professional 
management in the public sector; explicit standards and measures of performance; greater emphasis on output 
controls; shift to a disaggregation of units in the public sector; stress on private-sector styles of management 
practice; stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use” (Hood 1991: 4f). 
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challenge the state, and its value to public services. Wang and Kang (2018) observe a tightened policy 
and power reconfiguration, which commenced after the 18th party congress in 2012. This goes along 
with a reorientation from a purely state-centered, economically oriented policy to a more diverse and 
sustainable development policy and encompasses an increasing involvement of NPOs into state 
structures (Wang and Kang 2018: 1). In course of this development, the system of government service 
purchasing (GSP) from NPOs gained momentum, and the Chinese government stressed to “fully 
recognize the importance of GSP from social forces” (Wang and Snape 2018: 4).  
In Germany, the neo-corporatist welfare state traditionally involves non-state actors in the provision 
of social services (Evers 2011). For decades, a limited number of umbrella organizations operated in 
close partnership with the government and enjoyed a privileged position in policy making and access 
to funding (Zimmer 2010). Since the early 1990s, this position changed and gave way to a system in 
which NPOs must compete with for-profit social service providers (Freise and Zimmer 2019: 14). Freise 
and Zimmer (2019) argue that a new assessment of the German welfare state and the role of civil 
society is needed as the traditional welfare mix is currently at a crossroad defined by changing actor 
constellations, new social problems and new political strategies (Freise and Zimmer 2019: 395).  
This article wishes to contribute to the larger discussion on state-society cooperation. Particularly, to 
bring a more nuanced understanding of why state and non-state actors, in different societies, turn to 
outsourcing and Network Governance for the provision of social services. 
3 Data and Methodology 
This paper is a result of the comparative research project LoGoSO Germany China. The project is a 
three-year long cooperation between the Freie Universität Berlin, the Westfälische Wilhelms-
Universität Münster and the Chinese Academy of Governance, and is funded by Stiftung Mercator. It 
aims to identify, analyse and compare models of cooperation between local governments and NPOs in 
Germany and China. The country teams chose two sample cities in each country. 5 In order to ensure 
comparability, the two country teams selected cases of NPO-state cooperation in the four policy fields 
of education, employment, social assistance (including legal aid) and vulnerable groups, which 
represent core areas of social services for migrants in both countries. For crosschecking the results 
concerning the conditions for cooperation success and failure, we further selected one case in each 
city that was considered by stakeholders as a failure in respect to the cooperation.6 The two research 
 
5 The sample cities were chosen to represent one of the largest cities in each country (Berlin, Guangzhou) as well 
as one middle-sized city (Cologne, Hangzhou), which function as economic hub in their region. All cities share the 
characteristic of being immigrant cities with a well-established third sector. Berlin is the German capital and 
largest city of the country. As a city-state in the federal system, it enjoys relative freedom concerning policy 
development and implementation. Cologne, on the other hand, is subordinate to the state of North-Rhine 
Westphalia and bound to the guidelines and regulations as dictated by the state level. Likewise, Guangzhou is 
relatively independent as a city in China, which is due to its status as one of the richest and largest Chinese cities, 
which enjoys the status of a “Model City” for developing a public management system for migrants. Hangzhou is 
the capital and economic centre of Zhejiang province, its policy development and implementation however is 
mostly in reaction to guidelines from provincial or national level (Ketels 2019: 17). All four cities are strongly 
influenced by migration and turn to SOs in the quest for effective solutions for this challenge (Ketels 2019: 17-
18), Available at: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/17676. 
6 In our cases, failure means that a desired cooperation between NPO and state that did not take place, was 
aborted, or did not achieve the desired outcomes. This does not necessarily mean that the project of the NPO is 
also a failure. Due to the difficult traceability of cooperation that did not come into being or does not exist 
anymore, the selection of the failure cases turned out to be extremely difficult and in one city, cologne, finally 
was not successful.  
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teams did field data collection between July 2018 and April 2019. In each city, following an 
organizational approach, five cases were selected according to the following criteria: 
- All cases are a cooperation between an NPO and the local government 
- All cases are programs/projects that focus on services for migrants 
- The following characteristics of the NPOs bear the largest possible variety: size, age, run by 
migrants or not, funding source, competition, administrative level7 
The German and Chinese research teams conducted interviews with managers, staff and volunteers of 
the NPOs as well as with local government representatives. The authors of this paper were involved in 
all phases of the research. Backed by desktop research and observations, the interviews are the 
foundation of extensive case studies on each case. 
For this paper we applied a secondary analysis of the nineteen case study reports written by the two 
research teams based on their fieldwork. The aim is to identify underlying structures of cooperation in 
the German and Chinese cases and find patterns and reasons for them across different societies. Based 
on existing research we, deductively, tested earlier theories on state-NPO cooperation and, 
complemented these insights by, inductively, identifying the rationales underlying this cooperation. 
We argue that, while the structures are similar in Germany and China, the rationales behind the 
application of certain models of cooperation are different.  
In order to identify the structures, we coded the nineteen case study reports with the help of the 
software MAXQDA along the categories that we developed based on the theoretical framework of 
Third Party Government and Network Governance (see section 4). For the identification of the 
underlying rationales we inductively developed the categories during the coding process. The 
transcriptions of the Chinese interviews and secondary literature, including the LoGoSO Research 
Papers8, were consulted where additional information was needed.  
4 Outsourcing and Networking Models 
Since the early 1980s, third sector research in Western countries increasingly focused on the 
relationship between governments and NPOs. The realization that modern welfare states rely on the 
joint effort of governments and third sector organizations gave rise to various perspectives on this 
partnership focusing on the NPOs’ role in policy processes, the activities of NPOs, the modes of 
cooperation or the effects of the cooperation (Zimmer 2010). Coston’s Model is a concept applicable 
for classification and comparison of state-NPO relationships. It will be employed for a brief overview 
of all cases. To analyse these relationships in more depth, Third Party Government and Network 
Governance are concepts that capture well the complex relationships and operational work of the 
NPOs in both countries across the policy fields. In this chapter, we give a short overview of these three 
theoretical approaches. 
4.1 Coston's Model of Government-NGO Relationships 
Building on the related research literature, Jennifer M. Coston (1998) has developed a "model and 
typology government-nongovernmental organization relationships" in order to enable actors in the 
third sector to identify the most productive types of relationships for a particular context (Coston 1998: 
 
7 An overview of the nineteen cases’ basic characteristics is attached in the appendix of this paper. 
8 Available at: https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/17676.  
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358). This model distinguishes eight types of state and NPO-relationships. The types are defined along 
the following variables: whether the respective government resists or accepts institutional pluralism, 
the kind of government-NPO linkage, relative power in the relationships, the degree of formality in the 
relationship, and how favourable government policies are for NPOs. Each of the eight types is shaped 
by different dimensions and characteristics. 
We take Coston's model to categorize the cases of our study in order to compare them.  
 
Figure 1: Coston's Model of Government-NGO Relationships (Coston, 1998) 
Coston’s model proposes a linear increase of asymmetry in the power relationship. It argues that the 
exercise of government power is stronger at the left end of the model where governments do not 
accept institutional pluralism and therefore oppress NPOs. This kind of cases are expected to mostly 
appear in authoritarian regimes (Coston 1998: 363). However, our analysis in section 5.1 shows that 
institutional pluralism is accepted in all Chinese cases while the state exercises power to control this 
pluralism. In China, the state has a clear power advantage in each relationship and the degree of 
asymmetry does not necessarily correspond with the cooperation model as we will show in our analysis. 
We have therefore adapted the model by transferring the degree of asymmetry to the y-axis, so that 
the model becomes applicable for the simultaneous categorization of the Chinese and the German 
cases (see 5.1).  
4.2 Third Party Government 
In reaction to the fact that NPO-state cooperation was still a largely overlooked topic in the early 1980s, 
Lester Salamon started to develop and explore the concept of “third-party government”, which is 
summarized in his book on “Government-Nonprofit Relations in the Modern Welfare State” (Salamon 
1995). Salamon argues that a “lack of theory” was responsible for the absence of research in the 
growth and significance of the third sector in the United States. A new form of governance, which 
Salamon named “Third Party Government”, had developed and required a theory that acknowledges 
a government-NPO partnership that goes beyond welfare state and the voluntary sector theories (ibid.: 
15-16). Under “Third Party Government”, NPOs fulfil various government functions. Via different 
channels, the government transfers funds and responsibilities to NPOs, who become crucial actors in 
public service delivery and, at the same time, derive large parts of their income from the government 
(ibid.: 33-34). The theory of the welfare state obscures this development as it ascribes all authority for 
providing social services to the state alone. Likewise, theories of the voluntary sector, such as the 
market failure/government failure theory, cannot do justice to an effective state-NPO partnership 
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because they only explain the existence of the nonprofit sector as a substitute for shortcomings of the 
government and the market. These theories fail to explain regulated cooperation, government support 
for NPOs and joint efforts for an effective public management, thus a remaking of theory was needed 
(ibid.: 38-40). Salamon points out that the voluntary sector, just as the government and the market, 
also has some inherent limitations, as for instance limited resources, favouritism or a lack of 
professionalism (ibid.: 44-45). Regarding the concepts of this kind of voluntary failure and government 
failure, it becomes apparent that both the nonprofit sector and the government can profit from a 
partner who compensates the respective limitations. Salamon argues that “the voluntary sector’s 
weaknesses correspond well with government’s strengths, and vice versa” (ibid.: 48). A collaborative 
partnership where one actor is not a substitute for the other, but instead, the most efficient solution 
is for government and NPOs to join forces for effective public management. In other words, the 
modern welfare state “[…] is an elaborate system of ‘Third Party Government’ […], in which 
government shares a substantial degree of its discretion over spending of public funds and the exercise 
of public authority with third-party implementers” (ibid.: 41).  
Costen (1989) locates Third Party Government in the middle of the continuum between asymmetrical 
repressive relationships and symmetrical collaborative relationships (ibid.: 363). As a concept that 
accepts and formalizes institutional pluralism, Third Party Government is similar to contracting. 
However, it is more complex and goes beyond contracting in the way that it not only includes specified 
contracts for service delivery but may also consist of formalized tools such as loans or insurances, 
which transfer service delivery to NPOs in a more flexible way. Moreover, under Third Party 
Government the government not only shares assigned funds with NPOs, but also transfers authority 
about decision-making processes regarding the spending of funds and public administration (ibid.: 369).  
Our analysis in section 5 shows that both Germany and China employ many ideas of Third Party 
Government in different ways. 
For the purpose of deductively identifying the outsourcing structures, we coded the case reports in 
our qualitative content analysis along the five basic criteria for a state-NPO cooperation in Salamon's 
Third Party Government concept:  
1. existence of formalized cooperation: a cooperation which is somehow formalized and in which 
the NPO is officially recognized 
2. transfer of administrative responsibilities: a cooperation in which the NPO assumes public 
administration responsibilities  
3. complementary cooperation relationship: a cooperation in which the functions and 
responsibilities of state and NPO in the cooperation are complementary in the way that their 
respective strengths and limitations are balanced 
4. congruence of goals: a cooperation which is based on a congruent between state and NPO 
regarding the goals of public administration 
5. favourable power relation: a cooperation in which the state has a power advantage but there 
is also a certain degree of autonomy and/or participation in decision-making on the side of the 
NPO 
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4.3 Network Governance 
Most of the case reports in our sample show a high degree of networking on the side of the NPOs. 
Networks, or the embeddedness of (economic) actors, were most prominently described by 
Granovetter in order to explain economic exchanges (Granovetter 1992). Network Governance theory 
was originally derived from the observation that many industries increasingly use a form of 
coordination which is characterized by informal relationships rather than by bureaucratic structures 
within organizations. In addition, formal contractual relationships coordinate complex production 
procedures or services in uncertain and competitive environments. Jones et al. (1997) integrated the 
concepts of Network Governance and the theory of transaction cost economics in order to explain 
when it is likely that these kinds of relationships might occur and how they can help the involved 
organizations (businesses or NPOs) resolve their problems. Based on this approach Jones et al. 
redefined Network Governance as follows: 
"Network governance involves a select, persistent, and structured set of autonomous firms (as 
well as nonprofit agencies) engaged in creating products or services based on implicit and open-
ended contracts to adapt to environmental contingencies and to coordinate and safeguard 
exchanges. These contracts are socially—not legally—binding." (Jones et al. 1997: 914) 
By "select" they mean that network members usually form a subset of an industry in which they 
exchange frequently with each other. "Persistent" denotes the dynamic process of organizing and 
reorganizing the network by its members. In this definition, the network exchanges are described as 
"structured", in the sense that they are "neither random nor uniform but rather are patterned, 
reflecting a division of labor". Finally, "implicit and open contracts" are used here in the sense that 
exchanges are not governed by authority structures or legal contracts, but formed in a process of 
adapting, coordinating exchanges that rely on "social coordination and control, such as occupational 
socialization, collective sanctions, and reputations". This does not exclude the existence of formal 
contracts among some members of the network as long as "these do not define the relations among 
all of the parties" (Jones et al. 1997: 914 ff.). In order to explain, why this form of governance form is 
preferred by the organizations, Jones et al. use the basic ideas of transaction cost theory. They pose 
that organizations choose to organize themselves in networks under the conditions that environmental 
uncertainty demands adaption, the exchanges involve "unique equipment, processes, or knowledge 
developed by participants to complete exchanges, and the exchange is frequent, because frequent 
exchanges facilitate the transfer of tacit knowledge, facilitate embeddedness, and may provide cost 
efficiency” (Jones et al. 1997: 916).  
For the purpose of deductively identifying the existence and structures of Network Governance in the 
cooperation relationships between NPOs and local governments in our cases, we coded the case 
reports in our qualitative content analysis along the following four conditions proposed by Jones et al. 
as heuristic devices: 
• demand uncertainty: slightly adapted to this research project involving nonprofit actors we 
adapted the original uncertainty of (market) demand to an uncertainty of funding. 
• asset specificity, i.e. particular knowledge, skills or other assets are necessary to provide the 
required services, 
• task complexity, i.e. the service to be delivered involves several parties and subtasks that 
need special coordination,  
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• and high exchange frequency, i.e. regular exchange in the networks over a longer span of 
time9 
In the next section we conduct the analysis of the research reports. 
5 Analysis: State-NPO cooperation in migrant service provision in China and 
Germany 
The analysis comprises of three parts: First, we apply Coston’s model of state-NPO relations (5.1), 
thereby showing that the relationship between state and NPOs – despite the obviously different 
political and legal backgrounds in China and Germany – may take similar forms. The main difference is 
not in the degree of informality/formality, nor is it in the degree of the acceptance of institutional 
pluralism by the state. Rather, the main difference between the cases of the two countries lies in the 
degree of symmetry in the power relationship. Second, we analyse whether and how outsourcing of 
social services is put into practice in the two case countries. We show – along the criteria of Salamon’s 
Third Party Government theory – that outsourcing takes place and how it is implemented. In addition, 
we identify the rationales behind the outsourcing practice from the perspective of the local 
governments. Third, we identify and examine the rationales of networking behaviour of the NPOs, 
thereby taking the Network Governance theory as proposed by Jones et al. as analytical device.  
5.1 State-NPO relations – an application of Coston’s Model 
Coston’s model classifies state-NPO relationships by considering “government’s resistance or 
acceptance of institutional pluralism, government NGO linkage, relative power relationship, degree of 
formality, favourability of government policy vis-à-vis NGO, and other type-specific characteristics” 
(Coston 1998: 360). The cases in our sample cover six of Coston’s relationship models (see figure 3).  
 
9 In the analytical part we will concentrate on the first three heuristic devices. As for the high exchange frequency, 
we presume that such frequency is given in all the networks that we have analysed, otherwise we would not 
have regarded the network as existing (see 5.3.1). 




Figure 2: Adapted from Coston's Model of Government-NGO Relationships (Coston, 1998) 
There are competition, contracting and Third Party Government on the side with less acceptance of 
institutional pluralism. Competition is a relationship in which no formal linkage between government 
and NPO exists and the government regards the NPO as competitor rather than partner. Contracting 
and Third Party Government are formalised cooperation models where the government transfers 
responsibilities to NPOs but the government-NPO linkage is moderate. On the right side of the model, 
with high acceptance of institutional pluralism, cooperation, complementarity and collaboration are 
classified with an increasing degree of formalisation in the cooperation. Cooperation is an informal 
relationship where government and NPO coexist and are supportive of each other without engaging 
in any form of close cooperation. Complementarity is a bit more formalised in the cooperation and 
collaboration on the very right end of the model stands for the relationship model with the closest 
connections between state and NPO. In a collaborative relationship the linkages between state and 
NPO are very strong, responsibilities and information are shared and state and NPOs are highly 
supportive of each other. The German cases in our sample cover all these six categories, while the 
Chinese cases only show characteristics of the four more formalised relationship models. According to 
Coston’s model, governments exercise more power towards the left end of the model. Towards the 
right end of the model, governments are more supportive of the NPOs and allow for a more 
symmetrical power relationship (Coston 1998: 363). This model is applicable to the German cases in 
our sample leading to a linear decrease of power asymmetry with an increase of state-NPO linkages 
and a growing acceptance of institutional pluralism (as shown in the in-depth analysis of the German 
case studies by Lovelady and Grabbe 2019). The power relationships in the Chinese cases follow a 
different logic, we therefore adapted Coston’s model with an additional y-axis to be able to show the 
power relationships in the German as well as the Chinese cases. As can be seen in figure 3, the Chinese 
cases can be classified with Coston’s model if the power relationship is regarded separately from the 
relationship types. According to Coston’s model, NPOs would have most autonomy in a collaborative 
relationship. At the same time, there is a high linkage between government and NPO, information and 
resources are being shared, NPO and government jointly act and NPOs are also involved in processes 
such as planning and policy development (Coston 1998: 362). The Chinese cases classified in this 
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relationship type show these characteristics, with the exception that the government has a huge power 
advantage in these relationships and accepts, but at the same totally controls, this kind of institutional 
pluralism and linkage with NPOs. Institutional pluralism and linkages between state and NPOs have 
distinct top-down characteristics in the Chinese cases. Informal relationship models as well as 
relationships where the government gives up its strong power advantage do not occur. The degree of 
power asymmetry in the Chinese cases is irregular and depends on other factors such as field of work 
of the NPO, governance and structure of the NPO, as well as advantages or disadvantages of individuals, 
and their relationships to officials. The following analysis of outsourcing and networking trends in the 
German and Chinese case studies explains the characteristics and rationales of the state-NPO 
relationships in more detail.  
5.2 Outsourcing trends in comparison 
When analysing the models of cooperation between local governments and NPOs in social service 
provision, a general trend of outsourcing from the former to the latter can be observed in the German 
and Chinese case studies. This section explores the characteristics and rationales of this outsourcing 
trend. Salamon’s (1995) Third Party Government concept is employed as a tool to deductively identify 
the characteristics of the outsourcing systems observed in this study by analysing the case studies 
along the five criteria of Third Party Government as explained in section 4. Subsequently, the rationales 
underlying this outsourcing trend, which have been identified in an inductive content analysis with the 
help of MAXQDA, will be explicated. The cases that are classified as Third Party Government in Coston’s 
model represent the criteria of this concept well, however, the analysis shows that outsourcing 
happens across different relationship types and that these criteria capture the complex characteristics 
of the outsourcing trend regardless of the relationship type. Fifteen out of nineteen cases in our sample 
have distinct outsourcing characteristics, which are similar across countries and policy fields, while the 
rationales for outsourcing are different in China and Germany.   
5.2.1 Outsourcing characteristics 
Out of the nineteen case studies analysed in this paper, fifteen cases have distinct outsourcing 
characteristics, thereby fulfilling at least two of the five Third Party Government criteria. In our sample, 
four cases exhibit almost no Third Party Government criteria, eight cases exhibit some of the criteria 
and seven cases fulfil all criteria in one way or another. The four cases, which hardly meet the criteria, 
are the three cases of unsuccessful cooperation as well as one German case of a grassroots 
organization, which does not maintain any direct cooperation with the local government (Berliner 
Stadtmission/Refugio (Refugio))10. In Coston’s model, as for the German NPOs, these cases resemble 
informal relationship types (competition and cooperation), while for the Chinese cases the asymmetry 
in the power relationship is relatively higher. The seven cases, which meet all criteria of Third Party 
Government in Salamon’s sense are the three cases classified as “Third Party” as well as the German 
cases which have been classified as “Contracting” and “Collaboration” in Coston’s model. In what 
follows, the German case Kein Abseits! e.V. (Kein Abseits)” and the Chinese case Guangzhou Dinghe 
Social Work Service Center (Dinghe), which show the characteristics of the Third Party Government 
concept in an archetypal way, will be employed to illustrate the criteria for the analysis: 
Kein Abseits is a Berlin based association, which offers mentoring services for children and youth 
refugees to enhance equal opportunities. In 2011, the organization started out as a small private 
initiative and gradually grew as the demand for services, as well as the willingness for engagement, 
 
10 A list with all cases and their characteristics is available in the appendix of this paper.  
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increased. In 2016, the NPO began to co-operate with the government in the framework of the Master 
Plan for Integration and Security (Masterplan Sicherheit und Integration) (in the following “Master 
Plan”) which was developed in response to the new administrative challenges resulting from the large 
numbers of refugees entering the country since 2015. 
Dinghe is a nonprofit service centre for homeless people in Guangzhou. It developed out of voluntary 
engagement and was able to register as private non-enterprise unit11 in 2013, with the help of a private 
sponsor and the support of the local civil affairs bureau. In 2014, the organization won a contract in a 
competitive bidding process to receive government funding for a project in social assistance for 
homeless people and thereby began to develop a closer cooperation relationship with the local 
authorities.  
Both NPOs fulfil government functions and cooperate with the local authorities according to the Third 
Party Government criteria. However, Kein Abseits appears to pursue its own agenda in this framework 
while Dinghe develops into an agent of the state. 
In the following, the outsourcing cases will be analysed and compared along the lines of the five Third 
Party Government criteria. In each section, the two exemplary cases serve to illustrate an archetypal 
fulfilment of the criteria.  
5.2.1.1 Existence of formalised cooperation  
According to the Third Party Government concept, the NPO has to be officially recognized and the 
cooperation must be somehow formalized to be successful. Contracting is a common form of 
formalized cooperation, however, the Third Party Government concept goes beyond this form and also 
includes other cooperation set-ups.  
In our sample, in all cases of successful cooperation, the NPOs are officially registered and have a legal 
status, which grants them organizational independence and the official recognition by the state. In our 
sample, the German NPOs are either registered as associations (e.V.) or as private limited liability 
companies with public benefit status (gGmbH). The Chinese NPOs are registered as private non-
enterprise unit (民办非企业单位) or as membership-based association (社会团体).  
Kein Abseits is a registered nonprofit association. In 2016, the organization applied for a call of the 
Senate Department for Education, Youth and Family and entered into a contract to receive funding for 
providing services in the frame of the Master Plan.12 Since then, it is also officially recognized as 
provider of children and youth welfare services (Träger der freien Kinder- und Jugendhilfe).13 In this 
case, the German state provides funds on a contracting basis for NPOs that offer innovative and 
efficient solutions to deal with the challenges in the service provision for refugees (also see e.g. 
RheinFlanke gGmbH (Rheinflanke), Auszugsmanagement, Kein Abseits, AWO Kreisverband Südost 
(AWO)).  
In China, straightforward contracting usually happens under the framework of the system of 
government purchase of services that has been promoted by the Chinese government in recent years 
(e.g. Superior Power Social Work Development Center (Superior Power), GZ Lawyers Association, 
 
11 Private Non-enterprise Units (PNUs) (民办非企业单位) are one of three officially regulated types of NPOs in 
the Chinese Law, the other two kinds are foundations (基金会) and membership-based associations (社会团体).  
12 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 54 – 54. 
13 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 15 – 15. 
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Dinghe, Zhejiang Xiezhi vocational college (Xiezhi), Qidian Yixing). In the case of Dinghe, the local 
government in Guangzhou started a service purchase initiative as increasing numbers of homeless 
people, mostly migrant workers, on the streets of the city became a problem that the state could no 
longer handle alone.14 As the NPOs’ service provision met the requirements of the government, the 
Guangzhou civil affairs bureau and Dinghe signed their first three-year service contract in 2015. Since, 
the NPO has provided services according to the contract and the government, not only funds the daily 
expenses of the NPO, but has also purchased five additional projects after the initial bidding round.15 
These exemplary cases illustrate contracting as the most common form of formalized cooperation in 
our German-Chinese sample. Altogether, thirteen out of the fifteen outsourcing cases meet the criteria 
of a formal cooperation. In other forms of formalized cooperation the government employs or directly 
finances the project coordinator (e.g. Bridge network (Bridge), Chance+ Netzwerk Flüchtlinge und 
Arbeit (Chance+), Agisra)16  or the cooperation developed out of a joint idea and is based on an 
agreement, which regulates the responsibilities of three involved parties (Guangdong Beida Economic 
and Trade College (Beida College)). 17  In China, the formalized cooperation can also have the 
characteristic of a top down government project, when the government establishes and – based on a 
cooperation contract – completely controls the work of NPOs (HZ Lawyers Association, GZ Lawyers 
Association).18 
5.2.1.2 Transfer of administrative responsibilities  
Another criterion of Third Party Government that specifies the form of cooperation between state and 
NPO is the involvement of NPOs in public administration processes and the transfer of responsibilities 
from the government to NPOs. 
Apart from the described formalized cooperation, Kein Abseits is also involved in various structures of 
public administration, and not only receives funding from the government, but also exercises public 
authority and assumes certain responsibilities. In its part of the city, the organization is acknowledged 
as important actor and influences public decision making. 19  As co-founder of the “Netzwerk 
Kinderpatenschaften” – a network of Berlin social organizations that offer mentoring services, Kein 
Abseits has an impact on the social agenda of Berlin and organizes the distribution of mentoring 
services for refugees in the whole city.20  
Dinghe provides policy supervision, service guidance and takes government functions over so as to 
increase awareness and to satisfy basic needs of the people in Guangzhou.21 E.g. the NPO submitted a 
policy proposal on social services by NPOs on behalf of the homeless22 in 2017 and regularly publishes 
 
14 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 3 – 3. 
15 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 24 – 24. 
16 Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 86 – 86, Cologne\Employment_Chance+: 8 – 8. 
17 Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 44 – 44. 
18  Guangzhou_en\Social Assistance_GZ Lawyers Association: 49 - 49, Hangzhou_en\Social Assistance_HZ 
Lawyers Association: 30 – 30. 
19 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 7 – 7. 
20 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 45 – 45. 
21 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 58 – 58. 
22 The paper is called “Policy Proposal to Actively Guide the Intervention of Social Forces in Providing Social 
Assistance to Vagrants and Beggars”. 
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handbooks on their field of work that not only provide guidance to social workers and NPOs, but also 
seek to have an impact on public administration.23 
Such a transfer of administrative responsibilities from the government to NPOs can be observed in six 
of the cases in our sample. These are the cases which fulfil all Third Party Government criteria being 
intensely involved in governance processes and constituting exemplary outsourcing cases.  
5.2.1.3 Complementary cooperation relationship  
Salamon (1995: 48) argues that both the state and NPOs have inherent limitations and that they 
therefore need cooperation partners. In the Third Party Government concept, the strengths of NPOs 
counterbalance the limitations of the state and vice versa. The cooperation is therefore characterized 
by a complementary distribution of functions and responsibilities between the NPO and the 
government.  
The cooperation between Kein Abseits and the local government developed as a result of an urgent 
need on both sides. The NPO faced difficulties regarding their financial situation and sustainability and 
had to gain the trust of its target group, which was more likely to recognize an established player with 
government connections.24 At the same time, the local government faced huge challenges in providing 
services for the incoming refugees and administrative structures could not sufficiently deal with social 
inequalities.25 The biggest strength of Kein Abseits was a large voluntary workforce and its innovative 
and flexible portfolio which the local authorities cannot offer.26 The local government on the other 
hand was able to provide funds, development perspectives and more public recognition for the 
organization.  
In the case of Dinghe the cooperation developed out of similar needs. The local government lacked 
expertise and human resources to provide services for homeless people in Guangzhou and therefore 
sought a cooperation with a partner who could provide these services.27 Dinghe was the first NPO to 
provide such services in Guangzhou and was ready to fill this gap.28 At the same time, this NPO depends 
on regular funding and administrative support to provide its services and therefore depends on the 
complementary function of the government as purchaser of the services.29  
A complementary cooperation relationship between state and NPO appears as a basic precondition 
for a functioning outsourcing relationship, as all outsourcing cases in our sample fulfil this criterion. A 
key function of the NPOs in the cooperation is the provision of services the government does not 
provide but considers important. This is a distinct tendency in the Chinese cases, where many services 
are not covered by social policy. E.g. Xiezhi build a much-needed education and employment system 
in Hangzhou and won the support of the government as the local administration failed to bear this 
responsibility and welcomed the opportunity to outsource this task.30 In Germany, NPOs more often 
have the function of a bridge between the government and the target group. They help the 
 
23  Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 50 – 50, Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ 
Dinghe Social Workers: 50 – 50. 
24 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 40 – 40. 
25 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 33 – 33. 
26 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 68 – 68. 
27 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 9 – 9. 
28 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 9 – 9. 
29 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 27 – 27. 
30 Hangzhou_en\Employment_Xiezhi: 30 – 30. 
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government to gain better access to the target group (e.g. Bridge, AWO), support refugees in dealing 
with the complicated bureaucratic structures (e.g. Rheinflanke) or go into direct communication with 
the target groups – tasks which the local authorities apparently cannot accomplish (e.g. Chance+). 
Another important function of NPOs is the introduction of expertise and innovative solutions which 
often make them the trainers of public and private actors (e.g. Chance+, Xiezhi, Superior Power).  
Besides the allocation of resources, the state also fulfils the function of providing a support 
environment for the NPO. This is particularly important in China, where NPOs depend on a favourable 
political environment to be able to operate and gain some influence. The case of Xiezhi illustrates the 
importance of this government function in the cooperation particularly well as this NPO tried to 
develop a cooperative relationship with the local government to receive policy support and build a 
good environment for their own development while remaining independent of government 
resources.31 
5.2.1.4 Congruence of goals  
A cooperation in which state and NPO pursue congruent public administration goals is the basic 
precondition for a successful cooperation according to the Third Party Government concept.  
Kein Abseits has the intrinsic motivation to improve the situation of young refugees. The NPOs’ vision 
is to build a society where everybody is engaged in voluntary work and where the social inclusion of 
refugees is a matter of course, which does not need the support of public authorities anymore.32 With 
the development of the Master Plan, which states the social participation of refugees and civic 
engagement as key objectives, these goals officially became part of the public agenda.33  
Dinghe undertakes social service responsibilities that are desired by the government. In 2012, the 
central government of China issued the "Guiding Opinions of the Ministry of Civil Affairs on Promoting 
Social Forces to Participate in the Social Assistance to Vagrants and Beggars", which make this 
cooperation an important goal for the local government.34 As an organization operating in lieu of the 
state, the NPO in this case adapts to the goals of the local administration.35 
The cooperation in our sample is mostly based on common public administration goals. In both 
countries, state-NPO cooperation is only successful if the basic goals of the NPO correspond with the 
political agenda. However, in Germany it is possible and common practice that the NPOs criticize the 
existing public structures and advocate for a different implementation of the political goals (e.g. Bridge, 
Agisra)36, while the Chinese organizations see their role rather as an advisor of the government than 
as an advocate (e.g. Superior Power, Dinghe).37 
5.2.1.5 Favourable power relation 
According to the Third Party Government concept, a favourable power relation is one where the state 
has a power advantage, yet the NPOs cannot be completely overruled and have some influence.  
 
31 Hangzhou_en\Employment_Xiezhi: 29 – 29. 
32 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 32 – 32. 
33 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 53 – 53. 
34 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 60 – 60. 
35 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 50 – 50. 
36 Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 97 – 97. 
37 Guangzhou_en\Employment_Superior Power: 9 - 9, Guangzhou_en\Employment_Superior Power: 9 - 9. 
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The cooperation between Kein Abseits and the local administration is based on the guidelines stated 
in the policy agendas for social service provision for refugees, i.e. the Master Plan and its follow-up 
concept, the Overall Concept for the Integration and Participation of Refugees (Gesamtkonzept zur 
Integration und Teilhabe Geflüchteter). Kein Abseits first had to apply for funds and adapt to the 
requirements of these government concepts. While this led to a structural imbalance of power in 
favour of the state, the NPO could still influence the policy making process. The organization managed 
to become a relevant and established player in the local public administration and was therefore able 
to build a cooperation with the local authorities based on mutual trust and understanding. On this 
basis, the NPO gradually enjoyed more and more autonomy and authority.38 
Dinghe signed a contract with the local government, which determines the rights and obligations of 
both parties. It specifies instructions for the execution of service provision by the NPO and grants the 
government the right to supervise and assess the project implementation. If the government is not 
satisfied with the performance of the NPO, it can terminate the contract and refuse to pay any further 
funds.39 The government thus has a strong power advantage in this cooperation and the NPO must 
conform to the requirements of the government if it wants to sustain the cooperation. However, Dinghe 
is successful in offering services that the government cannot provide, and the local authorities 
therefore depend on the capabilities of the NPO. The NPO successfully influences policy making and 
has an independent board of directors, which manages its daily business.40 
These power relations illustrate how the legal basis grants a power advantage to the government in 
such a cooperation, however, successful and self-confident NPOs can build their own influence and 
keep a certain level of independence. Besides guidelines, regulations or contracts designed by the state, 
the power advantage of the government is usually granted through resources which the government 
can terminate any time or whose approval the government must renew regularly (e.g. Bridge, AWO, 
Beida College, Qidian Yixing). Staff overlaps, e.g. the NPO project co-ordinator is employed by a public 
agency also function as control instrument (Bridge, Chance+).41 In the cooperation relations of the 
Chinese cases the government is generally clearly in a dominant position. Only by winning the trust of 
the government, and following goals which are favoured by the state, can the NPOs work relatively 
independently, assume public responsibilities and even influence decision-making processes (e.g. 
Superior Power).42 Thirteen out of fifteen outsourcing cases in our sample fulfil this criterion. The 
exception in Germany does not stand in a hierarchical relationship with the government (Agisra), while 
the Chinese exceptions are completely controlled by the government and have no autonomy at all 
(Hangzhou and GZ Lawyers Association). 
5.2.2 Rationales for the outsourcing of services by local governments 
The analysis of the outsourcing characteristics shows that in fifteen out of the nineteen case studies, 
outsourcing of services from local governments to NPOs takes place. Four main motivations of the 
government for outsourcing have been identified: (1) to support the provision of public services; (2) to 
fulfil guidelines set by higher administrative levels; (3) to support government with NPO expertise; and 
(4) in the Chinese cases: to keep control and maintain social stability. In the following, the four 
 
38 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 69 – 69. 
39 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 27 – 27. 
40 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 61 – 61, Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ 
Dinghe Social Workers: 8 - 8. 
41 Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 65 - 65. 
42 Guangzhou_en\Employment_Superior Power: 54 - 54. 
LoGoSO Research Papers No. 13/2019 | 17  
 
 
categories will be examined to identify the rationales of the local governments to outsource services 
to NPOs.  
(1) Support public service provision 
In all outsourcing cases, the cooperation with the NPO is established to support the government in 
providing public services. The character of this support depends on whether the state offers any 
services in the respective field itself and whether the NPO simultaneously offers the same services or 
completes the government services. Competing services in the same field that are simultaneously 
offered by the state and the NPO occur only in the cases which do not show characteristics of 
outsourcing from the local government to the NPO. Outsourcing therefore happens when NPOs add 
services to government services to improve the efficiency and effectivity of service provision or when 
NPOs provide services the state would otherwise not offer to improve the efficacy of service provision 
(see table 1).  
Table 1: Characteristics of NPO support for the provision of public services  
 The state offers social services 
in this field 
The state does not offer social 
services in this field 
The NPO additionally offers the 




The NPO services add to the 
services of the state  
Improve the efficiency and 
effectivity of service provision 
(German outsourcing model) 
X 
The NPO offers services the 
state does not offer X 
Facilitate the efficacy of 
services 
(Chinese outsourcing model) 
In all German outsourcing cases, the NPOs add services to the services provided by the local 
government. This implies that the local administrations in Germany offer services in all policy fields 
that we studied; however, their services are not sufficient or need support and NPOs fill these gaps. 
Except the two networks Bridge and Chance+, which have been founded as part of a federal program 
to build local networks, in all German cases, the NPOs are the initiators of the project and actively 
foster the cooperation with the local government. The NPOs develop projects where there are 
problems and gaps in the service provision of the state and the local administrations develop 
cooperation with these service providers to support and direct their work and to make use of the 
expertise and innovative capacity of the NPOs. In these cases, the cooperation serves to improve the 
efficiency and effectivity of services. On the one hand, NPOs offer efficient solutions, to the 
bureaucratic and inflexible characteristics of local administrations in Germany. E.g. in the case of Kein 
Abseits, the NPO offers low threshold mentoring and education services for refugees in need, which 
cannot benefit from the services offered by the city administration as the bureaucratic preconditions 
and hurdles are too high.43 In the case of Auszugsmanagement in Cologne, the NPOs in the network 
have developed a system to provide cheap and flexible housing options for refugees and approached 
the city administration to cooperatively work for better housing conditions. As the city administration 
reached its limits due the continuous demand, they took the more efficient solution of 
Auszugsmanagement into their service portfolio.44 On the other hand, NPOs support the effectivity of 
 
43 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 33 - 33. 
44 Cologne\Social Assistance_Auszugsmanagement: 58 - 58. 
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government services, e.g. when the local administration struggles to access the target group. The NPOs 
build bridges between the target group and the administration and thereby support the services of the 
latter. Especially when dealing with vulnerable groups, a good connection and basis of trust is 
necessary to provide services. E.g. AWO in Berlin and Agisra in Cologne both have a long tradition of 
offering social services for women in need and facilitating the access of female refugees to public 
services.45  
The Chinese cases of successful cooperation show a different picture regarding the nature of NPO 
support for public services. While the German outsourcing models in our cases add to the government 
services, the services of NPOs in the Chinese cases offer services the state would otherwise not offer 
(see Table 1). This implies that the Chinese state cannot, or does not want to, provide its own services 
in the policy fields that have been studied and instead relies upon third party service providers to 
replace the government in this regard. The cases in our sample have three different characteristics: 
cases in which the governments takes the lead and initiates the project and cooperation (Superior 
Power, GZ and HZ Lawyers Associations, Dinghe, Qidianyixing Social Work Development Center 
(Qidianyixing)), cases in which the NPOs are the initiators and the government then transfers the 
responsibility for these services to the NPO (Hangzhou Net, Xiezhi), and a case in which the government 
and the NPO jointly took action to tackle a social problem (Beida College). In these cases, the NPO 
services facilitate the efficacy of public service provision. In the Chinese cases, the state wants to take 
pressure off the local administration and also develop solutions for social challenges. E.g. in the cases 
of the lawyers’ associations in Guangzhou and Hangzhou, this happens in a top-down manner where 
the government establishes the NPOs and directs the creation of public services. The case of Xiezhi in 
Hangzhou, on the contrary, is a bottom-up development, which provides services that were originally 
the responsibility of the government. However, the local administration did not succeed in providing 
the necessary services and subsequently embraced the solutions offered by the NPO.46 In other cases, 
social services provided by NPOs are arranged by the government to deal with new social challenges 
resulting from the large numbers of migrant workers entering the cities. E.g. in the case of the Superior 
Power in Guangzhou, the local government has reacted to social unrest and asked the NPO to develop 
new social services.47 
(2) Fulfil guidelines set by higher administrative levels 
In Germany and China, the local governments have additional reasons for establishing cooperation 
with NPOs, they need to follow the guidelines from higher administrative levels. In nine out of fifteen 
outsourcing cases in our sample, concrete guidelines or programs are mentioned as a reason for the 
local government to attempt a cooperation with NPOs. The respective guidelines are city specific. In 
Berlin, the “Masterplan Sicherheit und Integration” (Master Plan for Integration and Security) has 
strongly promoted state-society cooperation for the integration of refugees. In Cologne, no such 
overall program for refugees has been installed, but smaller guidelines such as a city council decision 
to promote the integration of refugee children and youth has influenced the cooperation in our case 
studies. In China, Guangzhou has the special status of “Model City for Service and Management of 
Floating Population and Ethnic Minorities”, which means that the central government regards it as a 
pioneer city and therefore establishes pilot projects of state-society cooperation for the integration of 
the floating population (Ketels 2019: 7). All successful cases in Guangzhou have developed as a result 
 
45 Berlin\Vulnerable Groups_AWO Frauenberatung: 46 - 46), (Cologne\Vulnerable groups_Agisra: 44 - 44. 
46 Hangzhou_en\Employment_Xiezhi: 30 - 30. 
47 Guangzhou_en\Employment_Superior Power: 52 – 52. 
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of this status and the corresponding expectations. Several additional guidelines such as the Guangzhou 
Social Work Service Matrix of “General Service + Specialized Service”, or the "Guiding Opinions of the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs on Promoting Social Forces to Participate in the Social Assistance to Vagrants 
and Beggars", have further promoted the cooperation in our sample. In Hangzhou, the influence of 
such guidelines is much weaker. With the exception of the lawyers’ association, founded in accordance 
with national guidelines, no superior guidelines are mentioned. The majority of cases in Hangzhou are 
projects that developed out of grassroots movement or individual engagement, which the government 
later made use of (Hangzhou Net Volunteer Branch (HZ Net), Xiezhi, Home of Grassroots (Grassroots)).  
(3) Support government with NPO expertise 
Another objective of local governments in their cooperation with NPOs is to utilize NPO expertise in 
the policy-making processes or their capabilities of training public officials or social workers. Eight case 
studies, without difference between China and Germany, explicitly name this rationale for the 
cooperation. E.g. in the cases of Bridge and Chance+ in Germany, the federal program (ESF-
Integrationsrichtlinie Bund), which promotes and funds the cooperation, explicitly states the goal of 
gaining experience and providing information to policy-makers and other public actors. In China, e.g. 
the projects and cooperation with the lawyers’ associations in Hangzhou and Guangzhou are explicitly 
developed by the government to utilize the expertise of lawyers for government objectives. 
 (4) Keep control and maintain social stability 
The fourth rationale has only been identified in the Chinese cases. In every Chinese case, a major factor 
of local governments/NPO cooperation in social service provision, is maintaining control and social 
stability. This factor has two aspects. On the one hand, the government wants to reduce risks in regard 
to social stability by taking care of social unrest factors and entrust NPOs with the execution of this 
task. E.g. in the case of Dinghe, the government seeks to prevent social unrest that could result from 
large numbers of homeless people living on the streets of Guangzhou by cooperation with an NPO that 
provides homeless services on behalf of the government. On the other hand, the government seeks to 
control and channel the productivity of certain groups according to government objectives. E.g. in the 
cases of the lawyers’ associations, the NPO serves to control and utilize lawyers by issuing lists about 
the social responsibility of lawyers and recruiting them for voluntary services that are directed by 
government agencies. 48  In the case of Beida College the NPO helps to channel and control the 
workforce of migrant workers as the local government wants to avoid social conflicts and instead utilize 
the migrant workers to promote Guangzhou’s development.49  
5.3 Networking trends in comparison 
All cases in our sample applied networking to various degrees. In this section we first – inductively – 
describe the various networking activities50 that occurred in our case studies (5.2.1); then, in a second 
 
48 Guangzhou_en\Social Assistance_GZ Lawyers Association: 37 - 37. 
49 Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 68 - 68. 
50 In practice, the boundary between cooperation and networking is sometimes blurred. For the sake of the 
analysis in this report, we distinguish cooperation and networking as follows: Cooperation is directly related to 
the creation of the product/service that is offered by the NPO; while networking activities indirectly support this 
creative process. E.g. cooperation is the case when the local government signs a contract with or informally 
makes the NPO provide a certain service; networking applies when NPO and representatives of local state 
authorities meet regularly in roundtable meetings to ensure a similar understanding of the services purchased 
by the state from the NPO. 
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step, we apply – deductively – the operationalized Jones et al.’s (1997) theory of Network Governance 
in order to understand the rationales behind the networking activities of the NPOs (5.2.2). Since 
networking is an essential part of the work of all the organizations in our sample, this section will not 
feature a “model case”. Instead, we will analyse and compare the cases along the categories developed 
from the Network Governance literature.  
5.3.1 Existence of networks 
As mentioned above, all NPOs in our cases were embedded in some kind of network, albeit the degree 
of engagement and size of networks differ. We identified different four types of networks: (1) networks 
in Germany and China which centre around organizations that are themselves organized as networks, 
(2) German and Chinese networks that have built complex stakeholder networks comprising of 
different organizations, (3) networks which explicitly do not include government agents in the German 
context; and (4) networks which are under the supervision and leadership of a local government agent 
in the Chinese context.  
First, some of the NPOs are themselves organized in the form of a network: the German Chance+ 
Network and Bridge are organized in networks, comprising of other NPOs, government agents, other 
networks, and cooperation partners for service provision. In both cases the government had, in the 
bidding process, explicitly requested applicants that were organized as networks.51 In the case of 
Auszugsmanagement, the local government itself has started organizing coordination meetings in 
order to build up the network for finding accommodation for refugees.52 In the case of the AWO 
Kreisverband the organization is embedded in the large network of the umbrella organization AWO. 
Beida College can also be subsumed under this category, since it is a network of the Guangdong Beida 
College of Economics and Trade, the Beida Alumni Association, other universities and the Guangdong 
Provincial Government.53 Kein Abseits, similarly, is a network and has initiated several new networks 
as well. That includes contacts to sponsors and with many organizations and institutions for the 
recruitment of the mentors for their programmes. This network is mainly composed of stakeholders 
and involves only few government agents. 
Second, other organizations are not organized as networks, but have built networks that include all 
relevant stakeholders. Xiezhi in Hangzhou, for instance, has built a network that connects the 
organization with various levels of government agencies and Communist Party officials in the capital 
Beijing and Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province. A considerable portion of the network is comprised of 
funders: Xiezhi is funded by various foundations (YouChange Entrepreneur Foundation for Poverty 
alleviation, Zengai Charity Foundation, and Zhejiang Women and Children foundation) and by large 
enterprises like Alibaba. The network also includes the companies that are potential employers for the 
migrant workers who are lodged and trained in the different facilities of Xiezhi and the universities 
that use the big data employment intermediation services of Xiezhi. In addition, the leadership of 
Xiezhi is a member of the board of a regional development centre (which might also be interested in 
the services that Xiezhi offers). Xiezhi also maintains tight relationships with all important media 
agencies and outlets. Similarly, the German organization Refugio is centered around a share house and 
coffee shop and has built a network that comprises of all the important stakeholders. It is managed by 
the Berliner Stadtmission, under the umbrella of the Protestant Church, which is a huge network 
 
51 Cologne\Employment_Chance+: 60 - 60, Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 50 - 50. 
52 Cologne\Social Assistance_Auszugsmanagement: 14 - 14. 
53 Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 3 - 3. 
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organization itself. Like Xiezhi, Refugio also combines its social services with for-profit-enterprises, 
albeit on a smaller scale. The Refugio Café is an enterprise that helps to finance the work of Refugio, 
but it is also the venue for language courses for Refugio residents and a channel through which the 
organization engages with its neighbourhood community. It further maintains a relationship with the 
Technical University in Berlin, by cooperating in the design of a rooftop garden for the university. 
Rheinflanke is organized around its services for young people in asylum homes and offers leisure time 
activities and education programmes. It is organized in the form of a stakeholder network that includes 
sponsors, resources for its services i.e. complementary service providers, providers of expert personnel 
and expert knowledge and government agents. These stakeholder networks generally include 
government agents.  
Third, another group (in Germany only) is imbedded in networks which do not include government 
officials. Agisra is such a case. Agisra is member of the umbrella organization Deutscher Paritätischer 
Wohlfahrtsverband and other working groups and networks (German and International). It has 
initiated an umbrella association and cooperates with the media. Agisra does not receive funds from 
the government. Be an Angel, one of the cases that turned out to be unsuccessful in terms of its 
cooperation with the local government, is another example of an NPO with a network that, overall, 
excludes government-related members. 
Forth, in several Chinese cases government agents had supervisory functions within the networks of 
which they were members. Dinghe, the project for homeless people in Guangzhou, is a good example. 
It is embedded into the network of “rescue stations” organized by the local government as well as a 
volunteer service supervised by the Social Affairs office of the local government. Although the two 
Chinese cases of the Lawyers’ Associations in Hangzhou and Guangzhou are huge networks54, due to 
their politically sensitive members (lawyers and law firms) and the work they do (counselling in labour 
disputes), they are tightly supervised by the local governments of their localities. Superior Power also 
belongs to this category of networks, since it was invited by the government to take over research 
work and supervision work for the government. Like other Chinese organizations, it has maintained 
ensured a certain network in its governance structure, with three external directors in the board from 
the media, university and a law firm. HZ Net is a branch organization of Hangzhou Charity Federation, 
which is a membership-based non-governmental organization in Hangzhou. Its network is widespread 
due to the good connections of the Hangzhou Charity Federation; it comprises of media, government 
and sources for volunteer recruiting. According to the field report, the local government has a guiding 
role that extends beyond the service contract signed between the government and HZ Net. 
The networks of the three cases in our sample, which we regard as failed as to their cooperation with 
the government, are embedded in networks as follows. The Volunteer Service for Sanitation Workers 
(Sanitation Workers) have a very small network that mainly comprises of, on the one hand, the 
volunteers, and, on the other hand, the sanitation station and the community neighbourhood 
committee, which have to be considered as representatives of the local state in the working area of 
the organization. One reason for not being able to extend the network appears to be the fact that the 
organization Sanitation Workers were not able to register officially and therefore cannot act as legal 
person on its own. The second Chinese “failed” case is Grassroots. This organization had a network of 
sponsors in the beginning, but lost all its connections to them later, when the organization became 
 
54 According to the field reports, the Guangzhou Lawyers Network has 15,000 individual and 700 group members, 
while the Hangzhou Lawyers Network has 7,213 individual members and 487 group members.  
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part of the local government administration. The fact that its legal status was unclear, because it was 
not registered as a social organization but as a business enterprise may also have contributed to its 
problems. The German “failed” case, Be an Angel, is embedded in a network of type 3 (a stakeholder 
network without particular tight government relations). The field report in part explains its failure was 
due to weak relationships with all members of the network. 
Table 2 Gives an overview of the types of networks that we could identify in our sample cases.  
Table 2: Overview of network types of sample cases 
Name of the NPO Type of Network 
Kein Abseits  (1) Network Organization 
Bridge  (1) Network Organization 
AWO  (1) Network Organization 
Chance+  (1) Network Organization 
Auszugsmanagement (1) Network Organization 
广东北达经贸专修学院 Beida College (1) Network Organization 
Refugio (2) Stakeholder Network 
Rheinflanke (2) Stakeholder Network 
杭州市慈善总会杭州网义工分会 HZ Net (2) Stakeholder Network 
浙江携职专修学院 Xiezhi  (2) Stakeholder Network 
Be an Angel  (3) Network Exclusive of Government Agents 
AGISRA  (3) Network Exclusive of Government Agents 
广州市黄埔区优势力社会工作发展中心 Superior Power  (4) Stakeholder Network, Supervised by Local 
Government 
广州市律师协会 GZ Lawyers Association (4) Stakeholder Network, Supervised by Local 
Government 
广州市鼎和社会工作服务中心 Dinghe  (4) Stakeholder Network, Supervised by Local 
Government 
杭州律师协会 HZ Lawyers Association (4) Stakeholder Network, Supervised by Local 
Government 
杭州市下城区起点益行社会工作发展中心 Qidianyixing  (4) Stakeholder Network, Supervised by Local 
Government 
关爱环卫工人志愿服务队 Sanitation Workers Apparently very small or no functioning 
network.55 
草根之家 Grassroots Apparently no functioning network.56  
Table 2 shows, first, that all organizations in our sample work in networks; and, second, that different 
variants seem to be more common in one country than in the other. The German case organizations 
are mostly organized as network organizations themselves, embedded in larger stakeholder networks. 
Organizations that are embedded in stakeholder networks exist in Germany and China. While in 
Germany we see stakeholder networks with and without government agents, the dominant Chinese 
variant in our sample, however, is the organization that is embedded in a stakeholder network under 
the supervision of the local government. This corresponds with our categorization of the organizations 
in Coston’s model above, which showed that, in China in general, the governments’ power is much 
stronger in the relationship between government and NPOs. 
 
55 Sanitation Workers uses its network (comprising of the community neighbourhood committee) mainly for 
recruiting volunteer workers. 
56 The network of this organization which was mainly comprised of sponsors dissolved completely after the 
organization took up relations with the government. 
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5.3.2 Rationales for the networking of NPOs 
We will look at the rationales behind the networking activities of the NPOs in our sample. According 
to Jones et al. (1997) organizations tend to make use of Network Governance under four exchange 
conditions: (1) asset specificity, i.e. when the NPO need special skills and knowledge to offer their 
services; (2) funding uncertainty, i.e. when the NPOs work in conditions, such as short-term funding 
programmes or fiercely competitive government bidding processes, which make long-term planning 
difficult; (3) task complexity, i.e. when the organizations have to implement tasks that involve multiple 
stakeholders and/or multiple problems and/or require multiple types of expertise. 
5.3.2.1 Exchange condition: asset specificity 
Jones et al. have found evidence that business organizations tend to build networks when they need 
special knowledge and skills for the delivery of their products. We find that this also pertains to the 
NPOs in our case studies. The analysed field reports contain ample evidence that NPOs maintain 
networks in order to make use of the skills and knowledge of the different network members. In 
particular, NPOs use these assets to (1) improve their visibility in the public and in the media, (2) ensure 
access to vital information for their work, (3) make use of for-profit-entities for their nonprofit work, 
(4) ensure access to expert knowledge for the provision of their services, and (5) function as an 
information platform in their field of expertise as one of the services in their portfolio. 
(1) Improving the visibility of NPOs 
Despite the different roles of the media, and the different degrees of media freedom in Germany and 
China, we found that NPOs in our sample maintain close relations to news media representatives and 
use the media to make their voices heard. Beida College cooperated with the Southern Newspaper 
Group, Guangdong Telecom Company and Xinhua Net in the fundraising and promotion activities 
during the start-up phase of the organization.57 Superior Power invited a reporter from Yangcheng 
Evening News into their board of directors.58 The founders of Xiezhi and of Dinghe are trained as media 
professionals themselves (a news anchorman and a journalist). When talking to the LoGoSO research 
team, the interviewees from HZ Net also underscored the organization’s media connections.59 The 
restaurant managed by Be an Angel is praised in the media60; Be an Angel also uses the media for 
advocacy purposes. 61  Rheinflanke’s board of trustees is “manned with celebrities from film and 
television […]”.62 
(2) Ensuring NPOs’ access to vital information for their work  
Successful NPOs need access to government information, including administrative requirements and 
bidding processes. Therefore, many NPOs include government personnel in their networks (as shown 
in the section on the existence of networks (section 5.3.1). While the connection to the government is 
usually the best choice for Chinese NPOs in terms of information access, in Germany, the connection 
to one of the big umbrella organizations or churches can also be helpful in this respect. Accordingly, 
many of our sample NPOs are members of umbrella organizations: Agisra and Rheinflanke are 
members of the Deutscher Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband, 63  Chance+ Network and 
 
57 Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 48 - 48. 
58 Guangzhou_en\Employment_Superior Power: 12 - 12. 
59 Hangzhou_en\Education_HZ Net Voluntary Branch: 31 - 31. 
60 Berlin\Unsuccessfull_Be an Angel: 62 - 64. 
61 Berlin\Unsuccessfull_Be an Angel: 33 - 33. 
62 Cologne\Education_Rheinflanke: 31 - 31. 
63 Cologne\Vulnerable groups_Agisra: 28 - 28; Cologne\Education_Rheinflanke: 32 - 32.  
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Auszugsmanagement belong to the catholic Caritas Verband,64 and the AWO Kreisverband is part of 
the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO). 
(3) Making use of for-profit-entities for their nonprofit work  
Several NPOs in our sample combined their welfare services with business enterprises, often with 
coffee shops or restaurants, but also with other for-profits. Apart from generating additional income, 
this cooperation with (or sometimes establishment of) for-profits also provides potential workplaces 
for the NPO clients (e.g. the cooperation between Xiezhi and Alibaba and other regional firms), venues 
for education and training (e.g. the cooperation of Bridge with Vivantes), or places to live (such as the 
co-habitation house of Refugio)65. A third function of such cooperation is further networking and 
exchange between clients (such as the Cafés of Rheinflanke and Refugio). Sometimes this kind of 
cooperation fulfils more than one function, such as the Restaurant “Kreuzberger Himmel” by Be an 
Angel, that is a venue for generating income and for the training of the NPO’s clients. Xiezhi specialized 
in big data technology and set up its own business. The firm deploys big data technology to facilitate 
more efficient and effective matching between the countries job advertisements and the graduates of 
China’s universities,66 thereby generating income, promoting the networks with universities across 
China, and solving the problem of matching talent and job opportunities. 
(4) Ensuring access to expert knowledge for the provision of services  
Probably the most widespread function of the networks for NPOs is to have experts at hand for the 
provision of the services. These experts might be lawyers, trainers, or others who are willing to share 
their knowledge and skills with the clients of the NPO. Dinghe, for example, established the 
“Guangzhou Street Friends Care Service Alliance” by uniting fifteen public welfare organizations in 
order “to provide training on handicraft production skills and lawyer consultation services for vagrants 
and beggars.”67 The teachers at Beida College come from their “teaching resources network,” which 
consist of fifty-four colleges and universities, ”including Peking University, Renmin University of China, 
Zhejiang University, Sun Yat-sen University, and South China University of Technology.”68 For its project 
HaPiEnd, the NPO Agisra, connects its clients (refugee women) with “motivated craftswomen or 
volunteers and provides the necessary materials and tools” in order to help them renovate their flats 
before moving in.69 Kein Abseits recruits students at Berlin universities to become mentors for young 
refugees to help them in with their school homework and communicate with authorities. 70 
Auszugsmanagement, which was originally focussed on finding and renting accommodation for 
refugees, has discovered that their clients often need further assistance and counselling. Therefore, 
the NPO has set up a network of related “public institutions, social organizations and welcome 
initiatives” that can assist professionally.71 Although this is a tendency across the two countries of the 
 
64 Cologne\Employment_Chance+: 31 – 31; Cologne\Social Assistance_Auszugsmanagement: 6 – 6.  
65 Refugio is not profit-oriented, but generates some rental income: While the staff of the Refugio house is paid 
by the Stadtmission, which also owns the building, the inhabitants either pay their rents from earned incomes or 
have their housing costs covered by public entities (e.g. the job centers) if they are unemployed or if their 
incomes are insufficient to cover living expenses. (Berlin\Social Assistance_Refugio: 19 - 21). 
66 Hangzhou_en\Employment_Xiezhi: 54 – 54. 
67 Guangzhou_en\Vulnerable Groups_ Dinghe Social Workers: 19 - 19. 
68 Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 20 - 20 (0); Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 56 – 56. 
69 Cologne\Vulnerable groups_Agisra: 37 - 37. 
70 Berlin\Education_Kein Abseits_Berlin: 41 - 41. 
71 Cologne\Social Assistance_Auszugsmanagement: 73 - 73. 
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investigation, we found that Chinese NPOs are often tightly connected to universities and also are 
involved in research projects, while this is the case only for some of the German NPOs in our sample.72 
(5) Functioning as an information platform in their field of expertise information platform (internet, 
social media etc.) 
Since NPOs accumulate a lot of knowledge, skills, and contacts in their daily work, it is a natural 
consequence that the organizations set up their own information platforms or establish their own think 
tanks. This is especially true for China, where the NPOs in our sample were often founded by 
intellectuals and had tight connections to academic institutions. Superior Power, for instance, set up 
“the Private Think Tank for Social Construction in Guangdong” focused on issues of government, 
philanthropy, women and corporates.73 GZ Lawyers’ Association uses internet technology to innovate 
legal aid, “including legal counselling, legal publicizing, and legal training.” With this technology, 
particularly mobile APPs like WeChat, it is possible to reach more clients and disseminate information 
in a more effective and efficient manner than offline.74 
In a nutshell, German and Chinese NPOs make ample use of networks and the available knowledge 
and skills in it, in order to improve their visibility (and thereby enhance public trust and increase 
donation income), ensure access to vital information for their own work, make use of cooperation with 
for-profit enterprises, guarantee access to expert knowledge needed for their manifold services, and 
build information platforms to share the information they accumulate in their projects. 
5.3.2.2 Exchange condition: funding uncertainty  
Jones et al. also found evidence that organizations build networks to mitigate the transaction costs for 
“demand uncertainty”. In the cases they investigated, such uncertainty would, for example, occur 
when the manifold companies in film industry involved in the production of movies would go through 
phases of uncertainty concerning their next mandate. We find that in the case of the NPOs in our 
sample there, is actually no demand uncertainty, because the demand for their services is 
overwhelming. However, there is a funding uncertainty that similarly affects the NPOs in our sample.  
The problem of most of the NPOs is not so much whether they can get contracted, but rather for how 
long, because there is a constant applying and reapplying process to access public funds.75 Another 
problem, in some cases, is that funding is limited to certain expenditure. Chance+, for example, found 
during the duration of one project phase that their clients needed a certain kind of counselling. So, 
they changed part of the project to meet this demand, but were not allowed to transfer part of the 
budget accordingly.76 We find that, in such situations, the NPOs in our sample resort to networks, 
similar to the supplier companies in the film industry. Many of the reports in our sample tell the story 
of networking with potential funders, in China as well as in Germany.77 Usually the NPOs must contact 
a number of different funders in order to implement one project. Rheinflanke finances part of its 
projects with funds from the European Union and other portions from different departments on 
 
72 Kein Abseits! is no exception to this observation because its existing connections to Berlin’s universities serve 
no scientific purposes but rather the recruitment of mentors for the education services of this NPO. 
73 Guangzhou_en\Employment_Superior Power: 22 - 22. 
74 Guangzhou_en\Social Assistance_GZ Lawyers Association: 52 - 52. 
75 Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 111 - 111, Berlin\Unsuccessfull_Be an Angel: 18 - 18. 
76 Cologne\Employment_Chance+: 88 - 88. 
77  For example: Hangzhou_en\Employment_Xiezhi: 54 - 54, Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 110 - 110, 
Guangzhou_en\Education_Beida College: 61 - 61, Cologne\Vulnerable groups_Agisra: 56 - 56; 
Cologne\Education_Rheinflanke: 69 – 69. 
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different levels of government.78 Kein Abseits receives public funding for 30 per cent of its work and 
needs to solicit the remaining funds from other sources.79 In some cases it takes years to achieve a 
commitment from local governments to fund certain projects or programmes. 80  Administrative 
requirements for NPOs applying for public funding can entail reporting requirements that may have 
an impact on the work of the organization;81 in some cases the requirements to obtain certain licenses 
as proof of competence in specific areas also mean additional expenditures for the NPOs that they 
cannot afford.82 However, it seems that for some NPOs in China, once they had gone through the 
competitive bidding process and won, they can be confident of funding on a long term basis. This 
seems to be particularly true for those NPOs that take over government functions, such as Dinghe and 
Superior Power. 
In short, although the demand for the NPOs was high, most of them work in difficult funding situations. 
Their cooperation within networks helps them to secure funding by incorporating funders into their 
networks and connect with them on a long-term basis. 
5.3.2.3 Exchange condition: task complexity 
Another similarity of the NPOs in our sample, with the groups researched by Jones et al., is that their 
tasks are highly complex. Integrate migrants and refugees poses challenges to local governments. 
Complexity occurs because (1) there are high numbers of involved people and parties, such as the high 
numbers of refugees in Germany and migrants in China requiring help; (2) problems to be solved are 
complex and demand complex solutions, for example solving the problem of housing sometimes 
entails psychological problems, as the case of Auszugsmanagement has shown; and (3) the resources 
needed to solve problems are usually scattered, ranging from the need for volunteers, experts, 
potential landlords and employers to funds and media support.  
Although the target groups and the political-legal and social background is different in China and 
Germany, some of these challenges are similar. And the NPOs, again, turn to networks to respond to 
these challenges. 
One challenge is that the number of involved parties is usually large – target groups, experts, funders 
have all to be approached in a coordinated way. The numbers of involved people in China are much 
higher than in Germany.  
(1) high numbers of involved people and parties 
The organizations respond to this challenge with their networks. The NPOs organized as networks 
themselves can organize large numbers of helpers to answer this challenge. The above-mentioned two 
Lawyers‘ Associations in China and the Bridge and Chance+ networks are examples of this strategy. 
(2) the problems to be solved are complex and demand complex solutions  
The examples of the employment NPOs, and the solutions they offer, show how many different tasks, 
fields of expertise and people are required for the employment of freshly arrived refugees in Germany 
and migrants in China. These groups need supports such as temporary housing, language training, 
 
78 Cologne\Education_Rheinflanke: 42 - 44 (0); Cologne\Education_Rheinflanke: 55 - 55. 
79 Cologne\Employment_Chance+: 59 - 59. 
80 Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 112 - 112. 
81 Berlin\Employment_Bridge: 112 - 112. 
82 Berlin\Unsuccessfull_Be an Angel: 37 - 37. 
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professional training, potential employers, and education. Again, as we have seen above, the NPOs use 
their extensive networks to provide their multi-facetted solutions. 
(3) the resources for solution of the problems are scattered 
Similarly, networks are also needed because there is usually a single source that can provide all that is 
needed to solve a problem. The section on asset specificity has already shown how the NPOs built 
networks to access expertise, knowledge and personnel that cannot be acquired at one specific place 
or from one specific provider. 
To conclude, networking is a trend that can be observed in all the cases in Germany and China. 
Organizations depend on networks – on relationships that are usually not governed by contracts - in 
order to deal with the steep requirements for skills and knowledge (asset specificity), the uncertainty 
of their funding and the complexity of their tasks, thereby ensuring access to the largest number of 
sources to help them solve society’s pressing problems. 
6 Conclusion 
In this study we asked about the underlying structures of state-NPO cooperation. In a qualitative 
analysis of the field research reports of nineteen German and Chinese cases of NPOs engaging in the 
field of migration we, first, identified patterns of relationships between NPOs and local governments 
by applying Coston’s model to the cases. We found that, across very different countries and political 
systems, NPOs both share many commonalities in their relationship types with the government and 
show a similar range of types. Taking a comparative perspective, we found that Coston’s model needs 
slight modifications concerning the power symmetries in the NPO-state relationships to be able to 
categorize German and Chinese NPOs at the same time. Figure 2 shows that the main difference 
between the two countries lies in the power symmetry and that, contrary to Germany, no informal 
cooperation models appear in the Chinese cases. The authoritarian character of the People’s Republic 
of China is reflected in this categorization. 
Second, by analysing the outsourcing activities of the local governments in China and Germany, we 
found many parallels but also some fundamental differences. Deploying Salamon’s Third Party 
Government approach in the analysis of our case studies, we found that outsourcing public services is 
a practice in most German and Chinese cases in our sample. The cases show outsourcing characteristics 
across different relationship types, countries and policy fields. In the German cases, the fewest 
outsourcing criteria are met in cases with an informal relationship type. The Chinese cases hardly meet 
outsourcing criteria when the power relationship is most asymmetric in favour of the government. 
Regarding rationales for the outsourcing of services by local governments, our data showed that local 
governments in Germany turned to NPOs to add to existing services, while Chinese local governments 
outsourced services that would otherwise not be offered at all. Outsourcing therefore improves the 
efficiency and effectivity of public service provision in the German cases and facilitates the efficacy of 
public service provision in China. This finding underlines the observation that China’s development 
model has long departed from the socialist idea of the state being responsible for all areas of society. 
In a way, the state in China is to a high degree, ready to outsource some of its responsibilities, thereby 
maintaining the final controlling power, while in Germany’s social market economy many 
responsibilities remain in the state’s hands and the local governments seem to prefer to solve social 
problems in a cooperative manner with the NPOs. Against the background of the first finding, these 
insights show that a state being authoritarian is not to be confused with a caring state. 
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Third, our analysis of the NPO’s networking behaviour was based on the theory of Network 
Governance as posed by Jones et al.. We showed that all German and Chinese NPOs in our sample 
turned to networking to overcome the difficulties of their working environment, which are mainly 
characterized by asset specificity, funding uncertainty and task complexity. We identified four kinds of 
networking: NPOs that were themselves organized as networks (sometimes upon the request of the 
local government, such as Chance+ and Bridge), stakeholder networks, networks excluding 
government agents, and networks in which the state had a dominant role. Against the backdrop of the 
authoritarian political system of China, and in accord with our findings on the cooperation patterns 
with Coston’s model, our data demonstrated that many (but not all!) Chinese NPOs in our sample were 
embedded in a network where local government had a dominating role. At the same time, almost all 
German and Chinese NPOs decided to include agents of government in their network, which helps to 
ensure the congruence of general concepts on how to solve the social issues at hand. Outsourcing and 
networking are common strategies of NPOs in China and Germany – despite all the obvious differences. 
Although the state plays clearly a more dominant role in authoritarian China, we were able to show 
that local states and societal actors in China and Germany can choose among diverse – rather than 
uniform – strategies to tackle pressing social issues. 
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8.1 The Chinese cases 
Name of the NPO City Policy Field Founding 
date of the 
NPO 
Type and administrative 
level of registration 
Cooperation project: 




Economic and Trade 
College (Beida College) 
Guangzhou Education 1999 private non-enterprise 
unit (民办非企业单位), 
registered at provincial 
level 
University Dream of 
Migrant Workers/ 2010 
Government funding, 
tuition fees, tuition 




Superior Power Social 
Work Development 
Center (Superior Power) 
Guangzhou Employment 2011 private non-enterprise 
unit (民办非企业单位), 
registered at district 
level 
Social Work Service 
Project for Migrant 
Workers in the Super 
Large Towns of Huadu 
District/ 2013 




Association (GZ Lawyers 
Association) 
Guangzhou Social  
Assistance 
1988 social group (社会团体), 
registered at municipal 
level 
Guangzhou Laborers' 
Rights and Interests Legal 
Aid Project/ 2013 
Membership fees (98%), 
government subsidies, 
social donations, operating 
income 
广州市鼎和社会工作服务
中心 Guangzhou Dinghe 




2013 private non-enterprise 
unit (民办非企业单位), 
registered at district 
level 
Project to Serve Vagrants 
and Beggars/ 2014 
Government purchase of 
services 
关爱环卫工人志愿服务队





2013 Not registered Volunteer Service for 
Sanitation Workers/ 2013 
Funding by the local 
sanitation station 





Hangzhou Net Volunteer 
Branch of Hangzhou 
Charity Federation (HZ 
Net) 
Hangzhou Education 2005 social group (社会团体), 
registered at municipal 
level 
“Little Migratory Birds” 
summer camp/ 2006 
Private funding by the 
founder, funding by 
enterprises, infrastructure 
support by the government 
浙江携职专修学院 
Zhejiang Xiezhi vocational 
college (Xiezhi) 
Hangzhou Employment 2008 private non-enterprise 
unit (民办非企业单位), 
registered at municipal 
level 
Job-seeking station for 
migrant workers, 2017 
Private funding by the 
founder, operating income, 




Association (HZ Lawyers 
Association) 
Hangzhou Social  
Assistance 
1991 social group (社会团体), 
registered at municipal 
level 
Action for the Protection 
of Migrant Workers' Rights 
and Interests/ 2018 
Membership fees, 
government funding, social 
donations, legal income 
杭州市下城区起点益行社
会工作发展中心 





2016 private non-enterprise 
unit (民办非企业单位), 
registered at district 
level 
Community integration 
project for elderly 
migrants/ 2016 
Government purchase of 
services 
草根之家 




2006 Not registered Cultural Center for 
Migrant Workers (X 
Service Station)/ 2010 
Corporate sponsorship, 
Oxfam fund support, 
government funding 
8.2 The German cases 





Name/ starting date 
Project funding 
Kein Abseits! e.V. (Kein 
Abseits) 
Berlin Education 2011 Association Mentoring program for 
refugees/ 2016 
Government funding, private 
sources, donations, membership 
fees 
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Bridge network (Bridge) Berlin Employment 1986 Arbeit und 
Bildung e.V.: 1986 / 






European Social Fund (ESF), 
funding by the Federal Ministry 
for Labor and Social Affairs, 




Berlin Social  
Assistance 
1877  Association under 
the umbrella of 
the Protestant 
Church  
Refugio/ 2015 Funding by Berliner Stadtmission 
(a mix of grants and subsidies, 
membership fees operating 
income), operating income of the 



















Funding by the senate 
administration 




2015 Association Be an Angel/ 2015 Private donations, sustaining 
members, fundraising campaigns 
RheinFlanke gGmbH 
(Rheinflanke) 
Cologne Education 2006/2007 Private limited 
liability company 
with public 
benefit status  
Project Hope/ 2015 Asylum, migration and 
integration fund/ funding by the 
European Union and the Federal 
Ministry for Labor and Social 
Affairs, operating income  
Chance+ Netzwerk 
Flüchtlinge und Arbeit 
(Chance+) 
Cologne Employment Caritasverband e.V.: 






Chance+ Network for 
Refugees and 
Employment/ 2014 
Joint program of the European 
Social Fund (ESF) and the Federal 
Ministry for Labour and Social 
Affairs called ESF Integration 
Guideline (ESF-
Integrationsrichtlinie Bund) 
LoGoSO Research Papers No. 13/2019 | 34  
 
 
Auszugsmanagement Cologne Social  
Assistance 
Cologne Refugee 
Council: 1984 / 







Funding by the city 
administration 




Association Activities for refugees/ 
2015 
Funding by state North Rhine-
Westphalia, the city Cologne and 
the European Union, case-to-
case funding by the public 
administration, donations 
 
